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Raúl Sanz Burgos, Madrid, Spain  
 
Democracy and Technological Politic in the Risk Society 
 
Abstract: New technologies generate risks, for the evaluation of which various mechanisms have been 
developed; the most frequent of these mechanisms consists of advice from committees of experts to the 
bodies  whose  role  is  to  decide  whether  a  new  technology  should  be  implemented  or  not.  Such 
committees try to measure the magnitude of the threats that accompany the introduction of a new 
technology in order that the policy-makers may take their decisions in the light of the reports of the 
experts. The legitimacy of such reports is not only found in the technical capacity of its authors, but 
also in the impartiality of their recommendations. On numerous occasions, nevertheless, the effective 
presence of this evaluation finds itself today under suspicion. There are various methods that can be 
employed  to  try  to  resolve  this  problem.  Firstly  by  reinforcing  the  mechanisms  on  which  the 
technocratic evaluation of the risk are based; for example, through transparency in the selection of the 
experts.  Secondly,  by  means  of  the  incorporation  of  democratic  mechanisms  in  the  scientific-
technological policy. The exposure of the internal conditions to the dynamics of the technological 
change that  make possible the institutionalised involvement of society in the control of risk, as well as 
of the mechanisms to realise it are the principal subjects of this work.    
Keywords: Technology policy, risk, evaluation, technocracy, democracy. 
 
I. The contract between science and society  
In the contemporary world science and technology appear as driving forces of economical 
growth;  hence,  developed  States  invest  great  amounts  of  money  to  keep  a  pace  of 
developments  which  allow  them  to  keep  their  countries  in  a  good  position  within  this 
dynamics. 
Economic development has not been, however, the only driving force of technological 
innovation, perhaps not even the most important. Especially in the United States, research has 
been aimed to the development of useful technologies from a military point of view, although 
the  need  to  make  these  technologies  profitable  in  the  civil  sphere  has  also  always  been 
present. The obligation to combine all these aspects has made collaboration among experts 
from different fields necessary.      
As a result of this factor, it has become evident that in order for science and technology 
to achieve progress, the work of experts in these fields is not enough, but collaboration with 
other specialists is also necessary. That is, science does not only depend upon the application 
of  methods  but  also  upon  a  much  broader  organizational  context,  which  supports  its 2 
development.  A  context  of  high  cost  that  can  be  maintained  only  for  the  economic 
contribution of society; that is why we often speak of the existence of a contract between 
society and science. Society funds research which is expected to produce some future benefits 
for  its  citizens.
1  This  fact  contradicts  the  widespread  perception  of  what  science  and 
technology consist of. 
 
II. The traditional conception of science and technology 
From a widespread point of view, science is understood as a “pure science” and consists of 
procedures which allow evaluating if a proposition that pretends to describe some aspect of 
reality deserves reaching the rank of scientific knowledge. In order to evaluate if a proposition 
can  or  cannot  be  described  as  scientific,  a  double  process  is  followed  which,  very 
schematically,  consists  of  contrasting  that  proposition  with  the  facts  as  well  as  with  its 
coherence towards the rest of the theory where it is integrated. Therefore, with the aim of 
making  effective  an  objective  and  free  of  interests  knowledge,  them  not  being  purely 
cognoscitive, the scientific method combines logic and experience, that is, combines the so-
called epistemic factors of knowledge. 
From that same approach, science has  a predominant  role over technology, which is 
simply understood as an applied science. Technology understood this way, lucks any value 
related to knowledge, as this only appears through the practice governed by the combination 
of logic plus experience. Any other factor –be it political, social or psychological- is valued as 
an obstacle for the progress of science and its technological application. That is why in order 
to explain the dynamics of scientific and technological progress, it is considered unnecessary 
to resort to these factors and, what is more important, that science and technology policies, 
which consist of leaving both to develop according to their own initiative, without external 
mediation, are considered adequate. Any attempt to guide scientific research towards a goal 
other than itself represents an attempt to deviate from the advancement of science.
2  
    
III. Scientificism and technocracy 
The image of science as an activity which, through the application of certain methods, enables 
us to reach an objective knowledge based on the real nature of the natural or social events is 
perfectly adequate to political approaches that exclude, or at least try to minimize, the value of 
                                                           
1 V. Bush, Science: the Endless Frontier, 1945; J. A. López Cerezo, Democracia en la frontera, in: Revista 
Iberoamericana de Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad, 3 (2007), 129 
2 See M. Polanyi. The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economical Theory, in: Criteria for Scientific 
Development. Public Policy and National Goals, ed. E. Shils, 1968, 9.  3 
citizen’s participation in public life. The scientificist ideology embodies itself institutionally 
in technocracy. 
Scientificism is characterized by asserting that each problem has an only correct solution 
and that the use of the ideal method enables us to reach this solution. Even more, science 
provides the only adequate criterion to distinguish real needs from other claims which are 
purely ideological. 
These presumptions rest on the distinction between problems whose solution provides 
some  additional  information  to  the  previous  knowledge  of  the  world,  and  those  other 
problems whose solution does not rest on or ultimately consist of the knowledge of the facts, 
but on a decision. The scientificist attitude considers that all the problems that cannot be 
solved through knowledge constitute a leftover of irrationality. Examples of such problems 
are  the  typical  matters  of  political  debates,  towards  whose  democratic  response  the 
advisability that they are solved through the information provided by science is considered. 
This way, the solution to human needs would remain entrusted to the experts and not to 
arbitrary individual decisions.             
Another feature of this ideology consists of the consideration of science as a neutral 
activity, quality which extends to technology as far as this is taken as a simple utilitarian 
transcription  of  it.  The  consequence  is  that  neither  of  them  can  be  submitted  to  ethical, 
political  or  social  analysis.  Subject  of  such  analysis  can  only  be  the  uses  made  of  these 
technologies,  nor  the  technologies  themselves,  considered  as  a  collection  of  tools  whose 
historical evolution enables us to recognize an increase of the capacity of human intervention 
in reality, but not any kind of change in its substance: the instruments are always neutral, what 
can  be  positive  or  negative  is  their  use.  Therefore,  the  only  thing  that  can  be  subject  to 
undergo  some  control  is  the  use  made  of  technologies,  not  their  development.  That  is, 
scientists are not responsible for the use – of the technical transformation- of the knowledge 
generated by them, neither technicians, as devices, or the great majority of them, can get 
different applications. 
The supposed neutrality of science and technology offers politicians as well as those in 
charge of developing scientific and technological programs their authority to support their 
decisions by it, which can this way be presented as objective, free of value judgments and 
prejudices. In short, they can be presented as rational decisions. The trust in the neutrality of 
science and technology is on the base of the supposed incompatibility between the efficacy of 
the scientific solution of problems and the interference of non-purely scientific factors. This is 4 
the  starting  point  of  technocratic  evaluation  of  technologies  and,  in  general,  of  political 
technocracy. 
According  to  this  approach,  technology  “has  its  own  dynamics  where  external 
interferences must not be introduced”. Consequently, “the question of evaluation becomes a 
technical question of identification and quantification of impacts with the hope that new and 
better technologies will solve the said problems and modify the negative public perception”
3. 
That is, the evaluation is a competence of technicians who measure the possible consequences 
of a technology and set out problems which would have to be solved by new technological 
developments.  From  this  perspective,  the  democratization  of  evaluation  can  only  create 
distortions, inefficiency. 
The most important reason by which the need to keep the circle of evaluation limited to 
the  experts  is  supported,  is  the  ignorance  of  the  majority  of  the  population  –and  its 
representatives- in technical matters. This reason is sometimes supported by very complex 
presentations of the technologies to be evaluated, which makes comprehension difficult and, 
with it, the possibility of proposing alternatives. 
Technocratic reasons, however, have found themselves questioned by several intellectual 
traditions:  some  examine  science  and  technology  from  their  roots  in  the  society,  others, 
however, point out that univocity of scientific answers to the problems has been lost at the 
hands of the increase of the indeterminacy of knowledge precisely because of the magnitude 
of  scientific  progress.
4  From that  moment,  the apparent  obviousness  of  technique as  a 
technicians matter has stopped being evident. 
 
IV. Some criticism towards scientificism 
The perception of the dangerous ambiguity of technology is the result of a long record of 
disasters, some of whose most important milestones are the use of atomic bombs to put an end 
to the Second World War, the arms race launched during the cold war, as well as several 
catastrophes which go from the entering into the food chain of contamination by DDT (and its 
consequences  of  malformations  in  the  newborns)  to  the  accidents  of  Chernobyl  and 
Fukushima. As an initial response to the concern caused by technology, during the sixties, 
some North American academic institutions as well as some of the most developed European 
countries instituted programs which analyzed science and technology from the perspective of 
their social, political and economical effects. In the following decade some agencies were also 
                                                           
3 M. I. González García, J.A. López Cerezo, J. L. Luján López, Ciencia, tecnología y sociedad, 1996. 
4 K. Braun and C. Kropp, Beyond Speaking Truth? Institutional Responses to Uncertainty in Scientific 
Governance, in: Science, Technology & Human Values, 35, 773.  5 
created which, taking those aspects into account, had to give advice to their own governments 
about the advisability of implementing some technologies or others.  
On the other hand, during the seventies, scientificism and its technocratic corollary, were 
strongly fought against not only because of the contribution of scientists and technicians to 
the  military  industry,  but  also  because  of  the  fact  that  it  represented  an  elitist  and 
antidemocratic  ideology.  Following,  the  reasons  for  this  assertion  will  be  discussed  to 
continue afterwards by presenting the transformations in the understanding of the dynamics of 
science and technology, which justify that the demand to democratize its evaluation may not 
be considered the futile result of a voluntarism that tries to extend democracy farther than its 
just limits.     
Regarding the elitist and antidemocratic nature of technocracy, it has to be pointed out 
that  the  sophisticated  technical  instruments  have  not  contributed  to  democratize  power 
relations,  rather  the  opposite:  technicians  have  become  part  of  the  elite  which  keeps  the 
majority of population protected and in a never ending under age. The increase of technical 
mediations, with the increase of the complexity that this carries within in every aspect of life, 
is the cause for one more advance towards the dependency of the majority in relation to a 
minority; in this case the experts and its esoteric knowledge. 
Regarding the second question, the studies about science and technology assert that the 
constitution of problems as subjects of scientific investigation is the result of social processes. 
This means that it is not possible to reach a good description of scientific dynamics if we only 
pay attention to its epistemic factors (that is, logic + experimentation/contrast of hypothesis), 
but it is also necessary to take into account other aspects as, for example, T. S. Kuhn does, for 
whom the explanation of scientific practice must also include the training of professionals in 
one speciality and their effective constitution as a scientific community. 
In  this  way,  science  is  no  more  understood  as  an  adequate  description  of  reality  to 
become a conventional representation of it.
5 That is, the preservation and change of scientific 
doctrines can no longer be explained as a continuous improvement of the experimentation and 
generation of hypothesis, but the social dimension of science needs also to be present. Under 
the rubric of the social dimension of science  we mean the study of the social circumstances 
where each scientific-technological formation is created and consolidated, as well as the 
consequences of such formations over life and social organization. In the light of this new 
knowledge, the fact that the best policy related to science and technology consists of leaving 
                                                           
5 Conventional does not mean, however, arbitrary, as doctrines are constructed according to ways of 
performance considered acceptable by those participating in the paradigm where the researcher has carried out 
his studies. 6 
them to develop themselves according to their own impulses, being them understood as purely 
cognoscitive, is no longer plausible.  
             
V. The evaluation of technology 
Technological evaluation consists of the application of a collection of methods which allow 
foreseeing which will be the consequences of implementing a technology in the productive 
processes  of  consumption.  With  this  prospective  aim,  they  try  to  find  which  will  be  the 
affected group in order to lessen the negative effects over them. From a critical point of view 
towards the evaluation of technologies, it is also pointed out that this pursues, mainly, to make 
social acceptance of the implementation of the technology in question easier.   
The specific evaluation of a series of processes can be summarized, very schematically, 
in the following way: it is about trying to determine the consequences of the implementation 
of a technology for the individuals as well as for the social, institutional, natural environment, 
the technological system itself, etc. It is therefore necessary to establish which are the most 
affected  groups  and  their  predictable  attitude  towards  such  implementation:  that  is,  if 
technology  will  or  will  not  be  easily  accepted  by  the  most  affected  groups.  The  fact  of 
carrying  out  these  tasks  correctly  should  favor  the  adoption  of  decisions  of  scientific-
technological policies suitable to the circumstances and support this way their foundation. 
This kind of evaluation, however, suffers from some defects which make the achievement of 
these  objectives  difficult.  The  most  important  of  such  defects  is  the  marked  economistic 
nature of the assessment.  
The evaluation is usually carried out according to a cost-benefit criterion that takes for 
granted  that  financial  yield  is  an  indisputable  sign  for  a  correct  policy.  This  approach, 
however, systematically leaves out of its balances pollution and, generally, the destruction of 
the environment. Facing this fact, in some occasions, this circumstance is proposed as an 
“externality” and the valuation of the damages are included in the price of the products to use 
the increase of the final price to activities that reduce the impact on the natural environment. 
In other cases, on the other hand, this possibility is not even taken into account and it seems 
that the only possible policy consists of hoping that some technology developed in the future 
will be able to solve these problems.     
For this reason, it is necessary to point out that when the evaluation of technologies is 
carried out through economicist models, the social and environmental consequences of the 
implementation  of  technologies  are  reduced  to  monetary  costs,  which  often  leave  on  the 
darkness consequences too heavy to assume. Consequently, against assessments which consist 7 
of  quantifying  such  costs  as  lower  to  the  predicted  economic  benefits,  it  is  necessary  to 
always  ask  ourselves  if  those  are  anything  else  than  a  rhetorical  mechanism  thought  to 
promote the interests of the corporations which benefit by the adoption of such technologies. 
To  try  to  correct  this  one-sided  way  of  understanding  evaluation  it  is  necessary, 
therefore,  to  establish  evaluation  processes  which  do  not  take  for  granted  what  a  correct 
policy of science and technology consists of. If there was an agreement on this point we 
would  be  in  view  of  a  similar  situation  to  the  dynamics  of  normal  science,  taking  an 
expression from T. S. Kuhn. The indeterminacy of knowledge as a result of techno-scientific 
progress together with the controversy inherent to the question about what a correct policy 
consists of take us to consider, however, that the process of evaluation of new technologies 
places us in a rather similar circumstance to the one which precedes scientific revolutions, 
when  the  evidences  are  unable  to  solve  the  problems  and  the  difficulties  are  not  settled 
through the application of the method, but through discussion, an activity to which all the 
members of the scientific community are called.
6 
This circumstance justifies, over and above any suspicion of democratic voluntarism, the 
need of evaluation processes where all those affected by the introduction of a technology are 
involved. The nomination can be extensive, but it becomes evident to point out that  among 
those called to express their opinion about whether it is convenient or not to apply a new 
technology, must be the engineers who developed it, the business people who are hoping to 
obtain some benefit from its use and who for this reason sponsor it,  ecologist groups, 
population groups on whom it is expected this technology will have an impact, political 
representatives of those population groups, trade unions as well as the professional people in 
charge of evaluating the impacts.  
The development of evaluation processes which take public participation seriously makes 
these processes into something transparent and, consequently, makes easier the acceptance of 
the  technologies  submitted  to  test.  The  involvement  of  citizens  in  decision -making  on 
scientific and technological policy can mitigate social resistance to the development and 
implementation of technologies in as much as it gives rise to a genuine process of social 
learning, in relation to which the contribution of empirical or local knowledge to sc ience and 
even more to the technical applications should not be underestimated.   
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VI. The democratization of the scientific-technological policy  
The  implementation  of  the  above  mentioned  methods  makes  the  public  control  of  the 
evaluation of technologies easier, but it is not enough for reaching an effective democratic 
control of the scientific-technological policy. This requires increased citizens’ participation 
from the genesis of the programmes in which that policy is substantiated: the participation 
cannot  be  limited  to  the  final  stages  of  the  innovation  processes,  when  the  democratic 
contributions can only be to approve or reject the implementation of costly programs. Such 
control  is  necessary,  apart  from  other  considerations,  because  the  representative  and 
bureaucratic authorities do not manage to convince about their efficient impartiality when it 
comes to relating the different components that have to be taken into account in order to 
decide in favor of one policy or another: environmental factors, social, economical, political, 
technological, etc. 
The  usually  proposed  solution  to  lessen  this  difficulty  consists  of  guaranteeing  the 
impartiality of the decisions through reports from experts who establish the purely techno-
scientific  facts,  free  from  ethical  and  political  adhesions.  Naturally,  this  requires  for  the 
experts impartiality to be beyond all doubt, for which the processes of accreditation would 
need to be impeccable and the selection processes of the experts transparent, able to guarantee 
the impartiality of their reports. The economic importance of the decisions to be taken and the 
connections of the experts from some areas to the businesses interested in introducing certain 
technologies into the production and consumption processes have generated, however, major 
doubts  about  the  impartiality  of  the  technical  reports  on  the  risks  associated  with  some 
technologies.
7 
There is no doubt about the usefulness of truly impartial experts who can act as advisors 
over the democratic evaluation of the s cientific-technological policy; this way, also, one of 
the most deeply-rooted approaches of technocracy can be integrated into the democratic 
control of science and technology. This way of control is the ultimate unavoidable aim given 
the impossibility of establishing a clear distinction between neutral components (technicians) 
and those who depend upon values and, consequently, are subject to discussion. This is the 
reason why decisions must not  –and  cannot-  be  exclusively  entrusted  to  the  experts:  the 
citizens advised by the latter must be the ones who decide in favor of some technologies or 
others. This approach means to admit that technological decisions are political decisions and 
                                                           
7 See J. Corti Varela, Globalización y percepción del riesgo: las preocupaciones de los consumidores del primer 
mundo como barrera al comercio agrícola internacional, in: Globalización y Derecho. Una aproximación desde 
Europa y América Latina, ed. J. Lima Torrado, E. Olivas, A. Ortiz-Arce de la Fuente, 2007, 157. 9 
that  the  decisions  adopted  on  the  margins  of  the  technocratic  approaches  are  not  placed 
therefore outside the limits of rationality. 
In order to unite rationality and democracy in the decision processes about science and 
technology policies, a series of assumptions about the final discussion and decision should be 
effective: it is essential to make explicit the values that lead to the response to a problem –for 
example the technocratic response- being itself understood as arguable. This way, the idea 
that the answer to a problem can deserve greatly varied answers which depend upon the point 
of view from which is dealt with becomes effective. The fact that the technical problem is 
shaped  the  same  way  as  a  social  problem  does  not  mean  and  incorrect  or  misleading 
formulation, especially once the character of social construction of scientific problems as one 
of the best settled data in the revolution of the history of science represented by T. S. Kuhn 
has been acknowledged. 
One  aspect  of  public  participation  whose  importance  should  not  be  scorned  is  its 
institutional articulation. Public participation has to be real, hence the complaints that are 
frequently formulated against government agencies – including parliamentary ones. In these 
agencies participation is through representatives and experts who escape with difficulty from 
the gaze of public opinion from the stigma of having been elected by representatives of one of 
the stakeholders. However, the reasons that the evaluation of these technologies are left in the 
hands of parliamentary committees should also be underlined. The democratic legitimacy to 
discuss  and  decide  on  any  political  matter  lies  in  the  Parliament;  opening  this  to  public 
discussion can disguise manoeuvres to steal from the legal body the power of decision and 
control over these policies
8.    
Before  concluding,  a  pro blem  that  afflicts  the  possible  democratic  control  of 
technological change and which perhaps explains the reluctance to accept it, should be noted 
clearly. Given the strong relationship between economic growth and technology mentioned at 
the beginning of these pages, one has to ask if the democratic control of technological change 
does not entail –nor even consist of - the democratic control of the economy.  
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